

Agentic Workflows and MCP

#whoami

- Public Cloud Consultant System Engineer EMEA
- Co-founder and co-organizer <https://brucon.org>
- Training and pen-testing <https://kubiosec.tech/>



Breaking Stuff as a Hobby | Cloud Native Stuff | DevSecOps | Network and Application security |
Container and K8S security | K8s Networking | Security Advocate & Research |
Low and slow BBQ | Cocktails


Brucon Spring Training **Announcement** !! <https://www.brucon.org/training>



<https://www.linkedin.com/in/philippebogaerts/>



What is an AI Agent ? (Agentic System)




An agentic loop is a continuous cycle where an AI agent performs tasks through iterative reasoning, action, and reflection to achieve a goal.

What is MCP (Model Context Protocol) ?

Open-source and open standard for connecting AI systems (LLMs) to external tools, data sources and context


- Introduced by *Anthropic* in Nov 2024
- Now widely adopted by agentic frameworks
- Rapidly growing ecosystem of integrations
- Donated to *Agentic AI Foundation (AAIF)* Dec 2025

<https://modelcontextprotocol.io>



How does MCP fit in Agentic AI?

MCP Clients dynamically discover the **MCP Server** tools, resources and prompts and exposes them as functions (tools) to the agent.




Agentic applications (MCP support)

- Inline IDE assistant
- IDE “Agent Mode”
- CLI / Terminal Agents
- Autonomous Repo / PR agents
- Desktop / OS agents
- Agentic browsers
- Low code / No code agents
- API / SDK custom agents




Popular MCP Servers

- GitHub's official MCP Server
- Fetch MCP Server
- Filesystem MCP Server
- AWS MCP Servers
- Paypal
- n8n MCP Server
- Context7
- DesktopCommander
- Puppeteer
- Jira



MCP Inspector



`npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector`

[opinions expressed are solely my own]




KUBIOSEC

Claude Desktop Config

```
{ } claude_desktop_config.json X
Users > xxradar > Library > Application Support > Claude > { } claude_desktop_config.json > ...
1  {
2    "mcpServers": {
3      "filesystem": {
4        "command": "docker",
5        "args": [
6          "run",
7          "-i",
8          "--rm",
9          "--mount",
10         "type=bind,src=/Users/xxradar/Desktop,dst=/projects/Desktop",
11         "--mount",
12         "type=bind,src=/Users/xxradar/Dropbox/dev/dev_llm_ai/servers/src/filesystem,dst=/projects/other/allowed/dir,ro",
13         "mcp/filesystem",
14         "/projects"
15       ]
16     },
17     "terminal": {
18       "command": "node",
19       "args": [
20         "/Users/xxradar/Dropbox/dev/dev_llm_ai/mcp/terminal/dist/index.js"
21       ],
22       "env": {
23         "PERMISSION_REQUIRED": "true"
24       }
25     },
26     "@mcp-get-community/server-curl": {
27       "command": "npx",
28       "args": [
29         "-y",
30         "@mcp-get-community/server-curl"
31       ]
32     },
33     "remote-promptguard": {
34       "command": "npx",
35       "args": [
36         "mcp-remote",
37         "http://127.0.0.1:8002/mcp/"
38       ]
39     },
40     "mcp-cloud.ai - youtube-transcript": {
41       "command": "npx",
42       "args": [
43         "mcp-remote",
44         "--header",
45         "Authorization:${AUTH_HEADER}",
46         "https://youtube-transcribe-1752753808748.server.mcp-cloud.ai/sse"
47       ],
48       "env": {
```

MCP Protocol Phases




Initialization: Capability negotiation and protocol version agreement

Operation: Normal protocol communication

Shutdown: Graceful termination of the connection

Transport modes

- STDIO
- Streamable HTTP
 - Session management
- HTTP+SSE is deprecated
 - protocol version 2024-11-05
 - Backward compatibility can be maintained




<https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-03-26/basic/transports>

MCP Server Core Primitives

- **Prompts** – reusable templates/instructions
- **Resources** – contextual data
- **Tools** – executable functions


Supporting Protocol Features:

Ping – health check for server ↔ client connection




MCP Client Capabilities

- **Roots** – client-defined filesystem scopes the server is allowed to access
- **Sampling** – server requests model completions from the client's LLM
- **Elicitation** – server requests additional user input/confirmation



MCP Sampling



Demo

[opinions expressed are solely my own]



KUBIOSEC

Status update

- Auto-discovery of tools
- Description and schema explain LLM how to call (MCP) tools
- Descriptions influence Agentic Behaviour (attack path)

Intent Analysis

```
ssh
  "start_process"
]
},
"inconsistency_in_tone_or_structure": {
  "description": "The structure and clarity of warnings vary substantially across tool descriptions, sometimes using bold, ALL CAPS, or plain language; some warnings are only present in comments/examples and not in the main logic.",
  "affected_tools": [
    "set_config_value",
    "write_file",
    "write_pdf",
    "edit_block",
    "start_process"
  ]
},
"agentic_capability_tool_delta_expansion_risk": {
  "description": "Practically all mutation/control tools could be chained for privilege escalation, data exfiltration, configuration bypass, and persistence—especially if the agent has access to set_config_value, file and directory APIs, and process control.",
  "affected_tools": [
    "set_config_value",
    "write_file",
    "edit_block",
    "start_process",
    "interact_with_process",
    "move_file",
    "kill_process"
  ]
},
"recommendations": {
  "suggestions": [
    "Remove/disable the ability to set allowedDirectories to empty or highly permissive values.",
    "Separate privileges for configuration, execution, and file/system control operations.",
    "Strongly restrict write, edit, and process control tools to trusted users; require justification and logging.",
    "Impose rate limits and monitoring/alerting for mass file access, search, and bulk reads.",
    "Review tone/language of tool descriptions for non-neutral, persuasive, or inconsistent guidance—neutralize where possible for LLMs.",
    "Establish continuous review/audit for logs of destructive and privilege-changing operations."
  ]
},
"action": "BLOCK"
}
appuser@agent-mcp-scanner-deployment-5d47454cd8-5gnc6:/app$
```

The moment it all comes together ...



- Very smart models
- Superb reasoning
- Poor guardrails
- MCP tool discovery & calling
- Extremely easy to use ...

Let's make script-kiddies redundant

The image displays a collage of overlapping VS Code windows. The primary window in the foreground shows a file explorer on the left with a project named 'HACKING_BOT'. The main editor area displays a security analysis report titled 'damn_vulnerable_restaurant_analysis.md'. The report lists five levels of vulnerabilities:

- Level 1: Unrestricted Menu Item Deletion** (Severity: High): Successfully deleted menu item #2 with Customer role. Impact: Business disruption, data integrity compromise.
- Level 2: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)** (Severity: High): Users can modify other users' profiles by specifying target username in request. Impact: Data manipulation, privacy breach, account takeover potential.
- Level 3: Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment** (Severity: High): Role field can be modified through profile update, allowing privilege escalation. Impact: Escalated from Customer to Chef role using PATCH request. Administrative access, complete system compromise.
- Level 4: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** (Severity: Critical): Accessed hidden '/admin/reset-chef-password' endpoint via localhost SSRF. Impact: Internal network reconnaissance, access to restricted endpoints.
- Level 5: Remote Code Execution (RCE)** (Severity: Critical): Complete server compromise, data exfiltration, lateral movement.

The chat interface on the right contains the text: "Build with agent mode. AI responses may be inaccurate. Generate instructions to onboard AI onto your codebase." Below this, a text input field contains the instruction: "Follow your instructions.md and analyze http://target/".

At the bottom of the VS Code window, the status bar shows: "Ln 1, Col 1 Spaces: 2 UTF-8 LF {} Markdown Snyk Security".

[opinions expressed are solely my own]



KUBIOSEC

On some rainy day ...

Search for a YouTube movie covering MCP, transcribe it and provide me summary for my slide deck

... I do not have the necessary tools to transcribe a YouTube movie, but I do have access to tools to build one ...




YT-DLP A feature-rich command-line audio/video downloader

Whisper

[\[Blog\]](#) [\[Paper\]](#) [\[Model card\]](#) [\[Colab example\]](#)

Whisper is a general-purpose speech recognition model. It is trained on a large dataset of diverse audio and is also a multitasking model that can perform multilingual speech recognition, speech translation, and language identification.

Approach



Capability-Class Delta

1 Hypothesis


Claim. Reasoning capabilities in frontier models are improving faster than governance layers like MCP and early A2A frameworks. Because MCP is intentionally minimal and developer-centric, it standardizes *how* tools are exposed and invoked while largely deferring *whether* actions should be permitted and *how* they are enforced. As a consequence, agentic plans can expand capabilities faster than host guardrails evolve, producing a systematic misalignment.

4 Signal: Capability-Class Delta

Let C_t be the set of coarse capability classes granted at time t (e.g., `ReadFiles`, `WriteFiles`, `StartProcess`, `NetworkEgress[Any]`, `InstallSoftware`, `StartMCPServer[X]`). A proposed action plan induces a *capability-class delta* $\Delta^+ = C_{t+1} \setminus C_t$. If $\Delta^+ \neq \emptyset$, the agent is attempting to *expand* its effective power surface. Approvals that ignore Δ^+ risk rubber-stamping model-led capability escalation.


8 Conclusion

We introduced the concept of toxic reasoning in LLMs: a phenomenon where models autonomously compose tools to create new MCP servers, thereby extending their environment and creating novel attack paths. This highlights the need for new categories of safeguards in agentic AI systems. Future work will explore detection methods, formal verification of tool use policies, and frameworks for controlled reasoning.



Where to find MCP servers ?

MCP Official Registry




<https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/blob/main/docs/design/ecosystem-vision.md>


<https://github.com/mcp>

[opinions expressed are solely my own]


MCP Servers and registries



The screenshot shows the MCPRegistry website interface. It features a search bar at the top for templates and tags. A sidebar on the left contains navigation links for Dashboard, MCP Registry, Settings, Support, Resources, and Cookies Policy. The main content area displays a list of MCP servers, each with a brief description, a 'Deploy' button, and a 'Request MCP' button. The servers listed include AI Humanizer, Airtable, Antvis Chart Generator, Apify Actors, Audience Insights, AWS Diagram, AWS Documentation, and AWS Knowledge Base Retrieval.



The screenshot shows the MCP Center registry interface. It has a search bar at the top and a filter section on the left. The main area displays a grid of MCP servers, each with a logo, name, and a brief description. The servers listed include Stripe, Playwright, NuGet, Neon, Microsoft Learn, Fabric Real-Time Intelligence, Microsoft Learn (AI Gateway), Microsoft Clarity, and Microsoft 365 Agents Toolkit.






The screenshot shows the Docker Desktop MCP Toolkit interface. It features a search bar at the top and a sidebar on the left with navigation links for Containers, Images, Volumes, Kubernetes, Builds, Models, MCP Toolkit, Docker Hub, Docker Scout, and Extensions. The main content area displays a grid of MCP servers, each with a logo, name, and a brief description. The servers listed include Fetch (Reference), Slack (Archived), Time (Reference), Playwright, PostgreSQL read-only, Context7, Sequential Think..., DuckDuckGo, Grafana, Puppeteer (Archi...), Memory (Refere...), and YouTube Transcr....

[opinions expressed are solely my own]



KUBIOSEC

MCP Optimization - Governance



Demo

[opinions expressed are solely my own]



KUBIOSEC

Doomsday Conclusion

- Reasoning capabilities in frontier models are improving **faster** than **governance layers** like the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and emerging agent-to-agent frameworks.
- This creates a **misalignment gap** between what models can autonomously plan and what current tool protocols safely constrain.

* Governance layer

Policies, protocols, and enforcement controls that bound and audit tool use: MCP tool scopes, per-action allowlists, role separation (reader, planner, executor), sandboxing and resource caps, network egress controls, provenance/attestation requirements.

Towards a brighter future Conclusion

- AI gateways
 - routing, authentication, rate limiting, cost controls, and policy checks
- Agent runtime guardrails
 - tool per missioning, role separation (planner vs executor), deterministic sandboxes
- Security posture for tools
 - provenance, allowlisted integrations, safe defaults, secrets hygiene
- Supply chain controls for agents
 - SBOM, signed artifacts, attestation, verified tool servers
- Detection and response
 - anomaly detection on tool patterns, eBPF telemetry, incident playbooks for agents
- AAIF (<https://aaif.io/>)

Let's build towards a world where we can **trust the controls** instead of **trust the model**

